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Abstract:	
	This	 year	 commemorates	 the	 bicentenary	 of	 one	 of	 David	 Ricardo’s	 lesser	 known	publications,	an	1816	pamphlet:	Proposals	for	an	Economical	and	Secure	Currency.	This	paper	 explores	 the	 meaning	 and	 significance	 of	 this	 work	 and	 presents	 a	 variety	 of	interpretations	that	have	emerged	about	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory.	The	commonly	held	view	is	that	monetary	concerns	were	only	of	marginal	importance	to	Ricardo.	The	paper	discusses	 the	 context,	 content	 and	 response	 to	 Proposals	 in	 order	 to	 evaluate	 this	commonly	held	view.	Furthermore,	the	scheme	Ricardo	lays	out	in	Proposals	is	intimately	connected	 with	 international	 exchanges.	 The	 implications	 of	 rival	 interpretations	 of	Ricardo’s	monetary	 theory	on	how	 the	balance	of	 payments	 and	gold	movements	 are	understood	are	explored.		
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1. Introduction		
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This	 year	 commemorates	 the	 bicentenary	 of	 one	 of	 David	 Ricardo’s	 lesser	 known	publications,	an	1816	pamphlet:	Proposals	for	an	Economical	and	Secure	Currency.	This	paper	 explores	 the	 meaning	 and	 significance	 of	 this	 work	 and	 presents	 a	 variety	 of	interpretations	that	have	emerged	about	of	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory.	The	commonly	held	view	is	that	monetary	concerns	were	only	of	marginal	importance	to	Ricardo.	The	paper	discusses	the	context,	content	and	response	to	Proposals	in	order	to	evaluate	this	commonly	held	view.	Furthermore,	the	scheme	Ricardo	lays	out	in	Proposals	is	intimately	connected	 with	 international	 exchanges.	 However,	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 various	interpretations	of	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory	on	how	the	balance	of	payments	and	gold	movements	are	understood	remain	insufficiently	disentangled.			The	paper	has	 three	broad	parts.	The	 first	discusses	 the	context	of	 the	debates	out	of	which	Ricardo’s	Proposals	emerged.	(Section	2	presents	a	detailed	overview	of	the	plan	contained	within	Proposals	and	Section	3	presents	the	reception	of	Ricardo’s	plan	and	the	ideas	 of	 his	main	 objectors.)	 The	 second	part	 of	 the	paper,	 Section	4,	 expands	 on	 the	analytical	issues	of	the	preceding	discussion,	delineating	the	various	interpretations	of	Ricardo’s	monetary	ideas	and	drawing	a	parallel	between	debates	over	monetary	theory	then	and	now.	The	third	part,	Section	5,	elaborates	on	how	different	understandings	of	Ricardo’s	 monetary	 theory	 have	 affected	 subsequent	 interpretations	 of	 how	 Ricardo	viewed	international	adjustment	and	changes	in	the	external	account.	Τhis	section	also	carries	forward	some	of	the	implications	regarding	the	current	international	monetary	system	and	the	hurdles	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory	still	faces.	The	interest	in	studying	the	debates	surrounding	Ricardo’s	Proposals	for	an	economical	and	secure	currency	(1816)	has	been	aptly	summarised	by	Marcello	De	Cecco:	“When	we	study	pre-1914	monetary	history,	 we	 find	 ourselves	 frequently	 reflecting	 on	 how	 similar	 were	 the	 issues	 of	monetary	policy	then	…	to	those	of	our	time”	(1974,	58).				
2. Ricardo’s	Proposals	for	a	return	to	gold		
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England	had	suspended	convertibility	of	its	bank	notes	into	specie	in	1797	and	during	the	early	 1800s	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 deteriorating	 economic	 conditions	 were	 the	 subject	 of	intense	debate.	Proposals	was	published	in	1816,	a	year	after	the	end	of	the	Napoleonic	wars,	and	contained	a	detailed	plan	about	the	logistics	of	how	the	Bank	of	England	could	return	to	the	gold	standard	all	the	while	maintaining	paper	money	as	a	means	of	payment.	The	 Plan,	 according	 to	 Fetter	 (1965,	 91),	 “showed	 him	 at	 his	 best	 as	 an	 economist”	because	it	provided	a	roadmap	for	the	creation	of	the	most	perfect	kind	of	currency	–	one	that	possesses	two	traits:	is	both	economical	in	use	and	secure.			One	of	the	grave	concerns	about	how	and	when	to	resume	convertibility	was	the	great	quantity	of	gold	that	the	Bank	of	England	might	need	to	purchase	in	order	to	satisfy	all	the	notes	that	holders	may	want	to	exchange	for	gold.	In	light	of	this,	the	first	version	of	the	plan	appeared	in	the	Appendix	of	High	Price	of	Bullion	(1810)	as	a	riposte	to	the	view	that	the	Bank	of	England	would	need	to	accumulate	a	great	stock	of	gold	in	anticipation	of	 resumption.	 Conversely,	 Ricardo’s	 plan	 suggested	 a	 means	 to	 reinstitute	 a	 gold	standard	which	wouldn’t	rely	on	gold	circulating	domestically.		This	 was	 to	 be	 done	 by	 prohibiting	 the	 convertibility	 of	 bank	 notes	 into	 gold	 coins,	enforcing	the	Bank	instead	to	have	to	pay	in	gold	ingots.	Ricardo’s	ingot	innovation	was	thus	to	“replace	metallic	coin	with	paper	…	using	an	ingot	of	standard	weight	and	fineness	instead	of	coin	for	the	conversion	of	the	paper	money”	(Takenaga	2016,	199).	The	need	to	economise	on	gold	as	the	circulating	medium	is	pronounced	in	Proposals	when	Ricardo	describes	the	perfect	currency	as	one	in	whose	use	“the	utmost	economy	is	practised”	(Ricardo	1816,	8).	This	would	reduce	the	amount	of	gold	needed	to	circulate	as	money	and	 so,	 according	 to	Davis	 (2005,	 194),	 the	 Bank’s	 gold	 reserves	would	 face	 reduced	pressure	 and	 demand	 by	 those	 wanting	 to	 redeem	 their	 notes	 because	 of	 the	 sheer	inconvenience	of	receiving	ingots	 in	return.	This	would	have	the	effect	of	allowing	the	Bank	to	maintain	a	smaller	hoard,	i.e.	smaller	reserves,	which	given	the	already	run-down	state	of	reserves,	was	an	important	consideration.	“I	think	there	would	be	no	provision	of	gold	necessary	beyond	that	which	the	bank	must	have	now,	however	small	 it	may	be”	(Ricardo	1819,	in	Sraffa	[1951-1973]	V,	383).	Ricardo’s	reputation	is	strongly	linked	to	the	Bullionist	controversies	of	the	early	1800s.	According	 to	 the	 Bullionist	 view	 the	 suspension	 of	 convertibility	 had	 led	 to	 an	
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uncontrolled	expansion	of	note	issue	by	the	Bank	of	England	and	part	of	the	public	debate	had	focused	on	identifying	the	cause	of	an	excess	note	issue.	The	Bullion	report	explains:	“this	excess	is	to	be	ascribed	to	the	want	of	a	sufficient	check	and	control	in	the	issues	of	paper	 from	 the	 Bank	 of	 England;	 and	 originally,	 to	 the	 suspension	 of	 cash	 payments,	which	removed	the	natural	and	true	control”	(Select	Committee,	1810:	73).	In	agreement	with	the	aims	of	the	Bullionist	position,	Ricardo’s	plan	was	to	alleviate	the	ills	caused	by	an	excessive	note	 issue	by	 the	Bank	of	England.	But	by	what	 criterion	 can	 ‘excess’	be	judged?	For	Ricardo	this	was	observable	through	the	divergence	between	the	market	and	mint	 price	 of	 gold,	 the	 latter	 being	 the	 legally	 set	 price	 of	 gold	 prior	 to	 suspension.	Monetary	 adjustment	 would	 achieve	 convergence	 between	 these	 two	 prices.	 For	example,	given	the	amount	of	Bank	of	England	notes	already	in	circulation,	there	would	have	to	be	a	reduction,	estimated	of	about	15%	of	the	note	supply	in	1810,	to	reach	par	(Bonar,	1923:	283).	“Ricardo	addressed	himself	wholly	to	the	question	of	the	adjustment	of	the	supply	of	money	and	the	price	level	to	the	price	of	gold	that	would	be	enforced	by	the	decision	to	resume	cash	payments”	(Sayers,	1952:	39).	The	aim	was	thus	to	close	the	gap	between	the	market	and	mint	price	of	gold,	which	he	viewed	would	only	require	a	small	reduction	in	note	issue	(Morgan,	1943:	44).			An	“appreciable	margin”	was	proposed	by	setting	the	price	for	buying	gold	slightly	cheaper	than	the	price	of	selling	gold	£3	17sh	6d	for	the	former	and	£3	17sh	10	½	d	for	the	latter”	(Arnon,	Weinblatt	and	Young,	2011:	29).	The	way	the	contraction	would	be	instituted	was	by	beginning	resumption	of	notes	for	gold	at	the	market	price	and	coming	down	in	small	steps	at	specific	periods	until	the	mint	price	was	reached.	The	 fall	 in	 the	price	of	goods	would	 follow	the	descent	of	 the	market	price	to	the	mint	price	of	gold;	a	process	which	was	estimated	to	last	up	to	a	year	(Bonar,	1923:	289).			Legitimate	 concerns	 about	 deflationary	 prospects	 of	 a	 monetary	 contraction	 were	implicit	 in	 the	public	discussion	about	 ‘economising’	 on	gold.	Later commentators have 
challenged the long-established view that Ricardo paid	 little	 regard	 to	 the	 deflationary	problems	 of	 monetary	 contraction.	 Although	 not	 a	 central	 concern,	 Ricardo	acknowledged	 that	 temporary	 problems	 could	 emerge,	 as	 Laidler	 (2000)	 and	 Sayers	(1953,	45)	point	out.	Sayers	(1953,	55)	recognises	that	Ricardo	did	take	note	of	the	effects	on	employment	of	a	monetary	contraction,	and	notes	that	Ricardo	always	insisted	on	a	gradual	contraction	(Sayers,	1953:	39).		
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	Frequently	 charged	with	 being	 a	 deflationist,	 Ricardo	 however	 conceived	 a	 plan	 that	would	 reduce	 the	 degree	 of	 monetary	 contraction	 necessary	 to	 return	 to	 gold.	 The	amount	of	gold	the	Bank	of	England	would	be	required	to	hold	under	his	scheme	was	minimised.	The	quantity	of	paper	money	in	circulation	could	then	be	more	easily	altered	to	meet	changing	conditions.	The	key	operating	principle	of	the	ingot	plan	made	the	task	of	the	Bank	of	England	to	alter	the	quantity	of	paper	money	in	circulation	in	such	a	way	as	to	prevent	divergence	between	market	and	mint	price	of	gold	(Deleplace	2016,	11).	This	 could	 be	 done	without	 any	 alteration	 to	 the	 quantity	 of	 gold	 held	 in	 the	 Bank’s	reserves.	This	is	what	is	meant	by	the	adjective	in	the	pamphlet’s	title,	‘Proposals	for	an	Economical	 and	 Secure	 Currency’,	 which	 is	 to	 achieve	 the	 objective	 of	 requiring	 less	circulating	gold	whilst	maintaining	the	currency’s	security,	i.e.	a	stable	value.	It	is	to	this	aspect	of	the	plan	that	we	now	turn.				A	“currency	may	be	considered	perfect,	of	which	the	standard	is	invariable,	[and]	which	always	conforms	to	that	standard”	(Ricardo	1816,	8).	Ricardo’s	plan	not	only	supported	the	resumption	of	cash	payments	through	a	scheme	that	would	economise	on	the	amount	of	gold	needed	but	it	also	allowed	England	to	resume	gold	payments	without	raising	the	value	of	gold	i.e.	its	purchasing	power.	“All	writers	on	the	subject	of	money	have	agreed	that	uniformity	in	the	value	of	the	circulating	medium	is	an	object	greatly	to	be	desired”	(Ricardo	1810,	7).	By	proposing	a	paper	circulation,	where	Bank	of	England	notes	would	be	convertible	into	bullion,	rather	than	gold	coins,	Ricardo	sought	to	improve	the	pre-1797	 system	 by	 replacing	 the	 expensive	medium	 of	 gold	 with	 one	 that	 was	 cheaper	(Ricardo	1816,	32).	However,	the	ingot	plan	goes	further	to	enhance	the	stability	of	the	price	 of	 gold	 via	 the	peculiarity	 of	 returning	 to	 gold	without	 it	 acting	 as	 a	 circulating	medium.	 If	 gold	was	 a	 circulating	medium,	 then	 any	 increase	 in	 the	 quantity	 of	 gold	supplies	would	 affect	 both	 the	 value	 of	 the	 circulating	medium	 and	 stocks	 of	 bullion.	Using	paper	for	circulation	however,	would	allow	the	price	of	gold	to	remain	constant	“regardless	of	the	amount	of	paper”	(Arnon	2011,	146).		The	advantage	of	paper	over	gold	was	that	the	quantity	of	paper	money	did	not	rely	on	the	production	process	and	deposit	discovery	of	gold	reserves,	a	source	of	real	instability.	With	a	changing	need	for	trade	and	changing	economic	circumstances	the	quantity	of	money	could	be	altered	fairly	simply,	which	would	allow	the	value	of	money	to	remain	more	constant	(Takenaga,	2003:	100).	
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This	 reveals	 Ricardo’s	 higher	 order	 purpose,	 which	 was	 the	 search	 for	 an	 invariable	measure	of	value.	
3. Reception	of	Ricardo’s	ideas	
 Although	it	was	his	contributions	during	the	Bullionist	controversies	that	made	Ricardo	well	known,	it	was	not	until	a	few	years	afterwards	that	a	return	to	convertibility	was	discussed	 in	 Parliament	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 plan	 laid	 out	 in	Proposals.	Legislation	 for	resumption	at	pre-war	parity	was	passed	in	1819,	only	to	become	operational	in	1821	-	however	it	was	apparent	that	the	means	by	which	this	would	be	done	would	not	follow	the	directions	laid	out	in	Proposals.			A	scramble	 for	gold	began	which	exacerbated	 the	high	price	of	bullion	and	depressed	domestic	prices	further.	The	Bank	of	England	grew	its	reserves	threefold	between	1819	and	1821	(Gomes,	1993:	93).	By	the	end	of	1821	the	drop	in	prices	was	far	greater	than	the	 10%	 admitted	 by	 Ricardo	 (Sayers,	 1952).	 Ricardo’s	 disappointment	 was	 great	because	 the	 ingot	 plan	 removed	precisely	 the	 need	 to	 scramble	 for	 gold,	 yet	 those	 in	control	of	the	‘company	of	merchants’	as	Ricardo	liked	to	call	the	Bank	of	England,	were	mismanaging	the	resumption	(Ricardo,	1816:	98).	He	complained	that	“every	ill	which	befalls	the	country	is	by	some	ascribed	to	Peel’s	Bill,	and	Peel’s	Bill	is	invariably	ascribed	to	me”	(Ricardo,	1821,	 in	Sraffa	 [1951-1973]	 IX,	122).	He	protested	about	 the	state	of	affairs,	as	he	had	proposed	“a	scheme	by	the	adoption	of	which	there	would	not	have	been	a	demand	for	one	ounce	of	gold,	either	on	the	part	of	the	Bank,	or	of	any	one	else,	and	another	is	adopted	by	which	both	the	Bank	and	individuals	are	obliged	to	demand	a	great	quantity	of	gold	and	I	am	held	responsible	for	the	consequences”	(Ricardo	1921,	in	Sraffa	[1951-1973]	IX,	123).			Hilton	(1977,	87)	elucidates	some	of	the	reasons	the	ingot	plan	was	not	adopted.	Seen	as	humiliating	and	unfair,	the	directors	of	the	Bank	of	England	were	unyielding	and	some	wanted	to	disrupt	it.	Other	reasons	for	the	ingot	plan’s	abandonment	are	put	forward	by	Smith	(2008):	the	government	“only	wanted	to	use	Ricardo’s	plan	as	a	means	to	compel	an	unenthusiastic	Bank	of	England	to	actually	abide	by	parliament’s	decision	to	resume	
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cash	payments”	(2008,	55).	Once	the	Bank	had	agreed	to	resumption,	the	specific	form	of	the	ingot	plan	was	abandoned	(Smith	2008).			Ricardo	 expressed	 his	 disappointment	 at	 length	 in	 his	 later	 work	 A	 Plan	 for	 the	
Establishment	 of	 a	 National	 Bank	 (1824).	 The	 Bank	 of	 England,	 a	 private	 join-stock	company,	was	abusing	its	position	and	profiteering	during	the	Suspension	years.	Ricardo	judged	the	Bank	of	England	as	being	unable	to	resist	from	profitable	lending	to	its	friends	and	he	found	its	excessive	profit	making	objectionable	(Sayers	1952,	32).	Returning	to	convertibility	would	discipline	the	Bank:	‘The	only	legitimate	security	which	the	public	can	possess	against	the	indiscretion	of	the	Bank	is	to	oblige	them	to	pay	to	their	notes	on	demand	in	specie’	(Ricardo	1810	in	Sraffa	[1951-1973]	III,	99).			Opposition	 to	 Resumption	 came	 mainly	 from	 the	 anti-Bullionists.	 Advocating	 a	postponement	of	the	return	to	convertibility,	 they	distinguished	between	what	caused	external	monetary	 problems	 in	 the	 exchanges	 and	what	 caused	 internal	 problems	 in	relation	to	rising	domestic	prices	(Corry	1962).		Anti-Bullionists	defended	gold	convertibility	being	suspended	on	grounds	that	shifted	the	blame	from	the	Bank	of	England	by	attributing	monetary	problems	to	different	causes	(Allen	1999).	Their	defence	of	the	Bank	of	England	came	from	the	real	bills	doctrine	and	the	law	of	reflux.	The	real	bills	doctrine	held	that	the	increase	in	bank	notes	by	the	Bank	of	England	could	not	be	the	source	of	monetary	problems.	Responding	to	a	demand	for	credit	 that	 was	 granted	 for	 a	 trustworthy	 cause	was	 seen	 as	 a	 guarantee	 that	 credit	creation	in	itself	could	not	be	the	source	of	inflation.	The	Bank	of	England’s	actions	were	not	to	be	blamed	for	inflation	for	it	merely	passively	responded	to	the	legitimate	demands	for	credit.			According	to	real	bills	doctrine,	appropriate	bank	lending	“should	be	confined	to	loans	made	on	the	security	of	short	term	bills	of	exchange	issued	by	reputable	merchants	or	manufacturers	to	finance	production	and	distribution	of	real	goods”	(Laidler	1984,	153).	Bank	notes	could	thus	never	be	excessive	if	they	were	created	out	of	genuine	needs	of	trade	and	production.	As	Corry	explains,	“such	issues	could	never	be	the	active	factor	in	any	price	rise	because	 if	 they	were	 the	equivalent	of	 real	 security	 they	would	only	be	
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meeting	a	demand	for	credit	which	was	already	in	existence:	hence	–	according	to	this	view	–	bank	credit	met	the	needs	of	trade	and	did	nothing	to	create	those	needs”	(Corrie	1962,	75).	What	follows	is	that	“a	rise	in	prices	is	not	typically	preceded	but,	on	the	contrary,	is	followed	by	an	 increase	 in	the	circulating	media”	(Blaug	1962,	195).	An	elastic	money	supply	 provides	 an	 inbuilt	 mechanism	 that	 annihilates	 purchasing	 power	 when	 the	typically	short-term	bill	expires.	The	Bank	of	England’s	liabilities	would	grow	on	the	basis	of	the	needs	of	trade	and	the	advances	made	to	government.	As	a	bank’s	assets	would	be	comprised	of	 real	bills,	 the	amount	of	 loans	 they	made	would	be	based	on	 ‘goods–in-process’	and	so	“the	means	of	payments	in	an	economy	will	necessarily	expand	in	pace	with	 the	volume	of	goods	produced”	(Blaug	1962,	195).	Thus,	 “even	 in	 the	absence	of	convertibility,	a	banking	system	which	confines	itself	to	lending	on	the	security	of	good	quality	 short	 term	commercial	 loans	will	 automatically	 act	 so	 as	 to	 stabilise	 the	price	level”	Willis	and	Edwards,	(1926,	494).		The	real	bills	doctrine	maintained	that	price	level	stability	could	be	guaranteed	if	bank	lending	was	responsibly	constrained:	Mints	(1945)	and	Laidler	(1984).		If	note	issuance	was	regulated	by	the	ability	to	discount	sound	real	bills,	gold	reserves	would	not	be	reduced.			Anti-Bullionists	instead	put	forward	what	in	modern	parlance	would	be	called	a	cost	push	view	of	 inflation.	 	 Bad	harvests,	 for	 example,	 caused	domestic	 price	 increases,	 not	 an	increase	in	paper	note	issue.		The	importation	of	expensive	corn	from	abroad	(because	of	the	measures	of	 the	Corn	Laws)	was	made	necessary	after	a	 string	of	bad	harvests	 in	England.	This	was	a	widely	recognised	contributor	to	the	economic	problems	of	the	time.	In	1802	Thornton	maintained	in	Paper	Credit	that	“Our	two	defective	harvests,	and	the	interruptions	 experienced	 in	 our	 export	 trade,	 very	 sufficiently	 account	 for	 the	 late	fluctuation	of	our	exchanges”	(Thornton	1802,	225).	 	The	high	price	of	bullion	and	the	depreciation	of	the	pound	was	largely	caused,	not	by	an	over-issue	of	the	Bank	of	England,	but	the	large	outflows	of	funds	from	England	to	subsidise	allies	during	the	Napoleonic	Wars	(Corrie	1962).			To	 summarise,	 Ricardo’s	 ingot	 plan	 was	 central	 to	 the	 discussions	 for	 reinstituting	convertibility,	but	it	was	not	implemented.	Although	the	blueprint	laid	out	in	Proposals	was	side-lined,	it	was	praised	much	later	by	John	Maynard	Keynes:	“Ricardo	and	other	great	authorities	have	advocated	as	the	best	of	all	currency	systems…	one	in	which	the	
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currency	media	used	in	the	internal	circulation	are	confined	to	notes	and	cheap	token	coins,	 which	 are	 made	 to	 act	 precisely	 as	 if	 they	 were	 bits	 of	 gold	 by	 being	 made	convertible	into	gold	for	foreign	payment	purposes"	(1913,	5).					
4. The	multiple	interpretations	of	Ricardo	and	his	critics		This	 section	 explores	 the	 diversity	 of	 current	 views	 about	 the	 precise	 meaning	 of	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory.	It	also	draws	out	the	diachronic	nature	of	the	controversies	of	 Ricardo’s	 time	 by	 linking	 his	 opponents’	 arguments	 to	 contemporary	 advances	 in	monetary	theory.		
a. The	traditional	interpretation				Ricardo’s	 theory	 has	 been	 described	 as	 containing	 insurmountable	 difficulties	(Lapavitsas,	1994,	Blaug	1997,	among	others).		The	inconsistency	that	Ricardo	has	been	criticised	for	arises	from	simultaneously	held	views	on	how	money’s	value	is	determined.			On	the	one	hand,	when	money	is	identified	as	gold,	it	has	a	commodity	character,	and	like	all	 other	 commodities,	 its	 value,	 according	 to	 Ricardo’s	 labour	 theory	 of	 value,	 is	determined	 in	 its	 production	 process,	 independent	 of	 the	 amount	 that	 exists	 in	circulation.	Its	value	is	related	to	its	embodied	labour	time	and	other	production	costs,	and	in	this	sense	it	has	an	intrinsic	value.	The	following	problem	presents	itself:	finding	a	measure	of	value	that	both	adequately	measured	the	changing	value	of	commodities	as	well	as	remaining	invariable	in	its	own	right.	Relative	values	of	commodities	depend	on	both	the	labour	content	of	their	production	as	well	as	distributional	issues	such	as	the	rate	of	profit.	“When	two	commodities	vary,	it	is	impossible	to	be	certain	whether	one	has	risen,	or	the	other	fallen”	(Ricardo	1816,	18).	Ricardo	himself	confessed:	“It	is	still	exceedingly	difficult	to	discover	or	even	to	imagine	any	commodity	which	shall	be	perfect	general	measure	of	value”	(Ricardo,	1823,	in	Sraffa	[1951-1973]	IV:	397).	 	In	any	case,	
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identifying	money	as	a	commodity,	whose	value	is	determined	like	any	other,	has	been	the	source	of	much	criticism	to	Ricardo’s	monetary	thought	(Lapavitsas,	1994).			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 strong	 identification	 of	 Ricardo	 with	 the	 Bullion	 Report	 has	traditionally	placed	Ricardo	 firmly	within	 the	quantity	 theory	 tradition.	With	money’s	value	determined	in	circulation,	money’s	purchasing	power	depends	on	its	quantity	and	the	volume	of	transactions	(see	Takenaga,	2003	for	an	elaboration).	The	precise	meaning	of	this	is	also	subject	to	interpretation.		In	modern	minds	the	quantity	theory	of	money	is	a	 simple	 dictum	 whereby	 an	 exogenous	 increase	 in	 the	 money	 supply	 will	 cause	 a	proportionate	 rise	 in	 the	 price	 level.	 However,	 there	 is	 substantial	misrepresentation	about	 the	 Classical	 theorists’	 views.	 Early	 nineteenth	 century	 quantity	 theory	 was	heterogeneous,	nuanced	and	qualified;	according	to	Harris	(1985)	for	example,	the	crude	version	 of	 the	 quantity	 theory	 became	 popular	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 and	was	 not	actually	 a	 feature	 of	 Classical	 theorists.	 	 The	 quantity	 theory	 can	 be	more	 accurately	viewed	as	a	paradigm,	rather	than	a	single	theory	(Harris,	1985),	which	confirms	Corry’s	(1962)	main	thesis	that	the	popular	views	surrounding	Classical	monetary	orthodoxy	are	unhelpful	 descriptions	 of	 Classical	 monetary	 thought,	 as	 they	 tend	 to	 be	 grossly	simplified.		Although	subsequent	work	has	sought	to	amend	the	view	that	Ricardo	was	behind	the	Bullionist	Report	of	1810,	which	among	others	was	drafted	by	Thornton	(Fetter,	1959),	more	 important	 is	 whether	 Ricardo	 indeed	 concurred	 with	 a	 simple	 proportionality	principle,	a	view	that	has	been	significantly	revised	and	qualified.			 b. The	new	interpretation	A	new	interpretation	of	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory	has	been	proposed	(Marcuzzo	1987,	1994a,	 1994b;	 Rosselli	 1987,	 1994a,	 1994b,	 1999,	 2013;	 Deleplace	 2016).	 It	 helps	disentangle	the	claim	that	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory	is	inconsistent	and	overturns	his	status	as	a	deficient	monetary	theorist.	The	question	arises	as	to	how	a	man	whose	life	profession	was	to	work	in	the	money	markets	be	ignorant	about	their	operation.	In	order	to	correct	the	misinterpretations	of	Ricardo’s	work	that	arise	from	the	aforementioned	implications	 of	 the	 traditional	 interpretation,	 the	 new	 interpretation	 emphasizes	 the	
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distinction	Ricardo	made	between	the	value	of	money	and	value	of	gold	(Marcuzzo	and	Rosselli,	1994).	Commentators	have	mistakenly	ascribed	to	Ricardo	the	view	that	the	role	of	 gold	 is	 to	provide	 for	money’s	value.	The	new	 interpretation	proposes	 instead	 that	Ricardo’s	purpose	was	to	minimise	the	possible	sources	of	monetary	instability,	which	can	be	done	by	making	gold	the	frame	of	reference	from	which	fluctuating	prices	of	other	commodities	can	be	measured.	It	is	from	this	perspective	that	his	policy	recommendation	contained	within	Proposals	can	be	better	understood.	According	to	Ricardo:	“When	two	commodities	vary	in	relative	values,	it	is	impossible	with	certainty	to	say,	whether	the	one	rises,	or	the	other	falls;	so	that	if	we	adopted	a	currency	without	a	standard	…	[the]	depreciation	could	not	admit	of	proof,	as	it	may	always	be	affirmed	that	commodities	had	risen	in	value,	and	that	money	had	not	fallen”	(Ricardo	1816,	19).	If	we	use	an	analogy	with	units	of	length	measurement,	by	keeping	the	ruler’s	units	fixed,	varying	lengths	of	objects	can	be	measured;	if	the	length	of	a	measurement	unit	keeps	changing,	a	change	in	measurement	may	reflect	a	change	in	the	unit	of	measurement	or	a	change	in	the	item	being	measured,	but	it	would	be	impossible	to	distinguish	between	them.	(Note however 
that the difference with length measurements as explained by Deleplace [2016, 6]). This	substantiates	Marcuzzo	and	Rosselli’s	claim	that	the	role	of	gold	for	Ricardo	“is	not	as	money,	 but	 as	 the	 standard	of	money,	 i.e.	 the	means	 to	measure	 the	 value	of	money”	(Marcuzzo	and	Rosselli	1994,	1253).	  	Using	gold	as	 the	standard,	 the	value	of	a	paper	medium	would	be	determined	by	the	amount	of	gold	it	can	buy.	“It	is	immaterial	whether	the	circulating	medium	is	made	up	of	full	 bodied	 gold	 coins	 or	 of	 debased	 coins	 or	 paper	 money	 (whether	 convertible	 or	inconvertible):	the	value	of	money	is	always	determined	by	the	quantity	of	gold	bullion	that	one	unit	of	currency	can	buy	on	the	domestic	and	foreign	markets,	according	to	the	prices	of	gold	and	the	exchange	rate”	(Marcuzzo	and	Roselli	1994,	1253).	A	change	in	the	value	of	money	could	be	identified	from	the	difference	between	the	mint	and	market	price	of	gold:	i.e.	between	the	fixed	price	that	has	been	set	by	law	of	the	weight	of	metal	that	is	analogous	to	a	monetary	unit,	and	the	amounts	of	monetary	units	that	can	be	given	in	the	market	by	selling	a	quantity	of	metal.	When	these	diverge,	and	the	market	price	is	greater	than	the	mint	price,	opportunities	for	profitable	arbitrage	materialise,	and	people	melt	their	coins	into	bullion	to	sell	for	the	market	price	which	is	higher	than	its	mint.	If	this	
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process	entails	demanding	the	Bank	to	exchange	a	holder’s	notes	for	gold	taken	from	the	banks	reserves,	in	order	to	profit	from	the	margin,	there	will	be	a	strain	on	reserves.			Ellis	summarised	the	two	broad	approaches	to	theories	of	money	as:	“those	which	regard	it	 as	 something	more,	 and	 those	which	 regard	 it	 as	 something	 less,	 than	an	economic	commodity”	 (Ellis,	 1937:	 3).	 Taking	 the	 new	 interpretation	 view,	 we	 could	 say	 that	indeed,	for	Ricardo,	money	is	a	commodity,	but	what	makes	it	a	special	commodity	unlike	others	is	that	is	has	two	prices:	one	set	by	law	and	one	by	the	market	(Deleplace,	2016,	6).	One	of	the	problems	of	inconvertibility	is	that	one	loses	control	over	a	potential	handle	on	 the	 source	 of	 price	 instability;	 variations	 in	 the	 value	 of	 money	 could	 not	 be	 as	effectively	managed	as	compared	to	 the	 ingot	plan.	The	mechanism	to	ensure	 the	 two	prices	do	not	diverge	is	broken.	It	is	in	this	respect	that	Ricardo	talks	of	an	excess	note	issue	when	 it	 is	 entirely	based	on	 the	demands	made	by	merchants	 for	 loans	and	 the	needs	of	 government.	The	Bullion	Report	 is	 clear:	 ‘That	 excess	 cannot	be	 exported	 to	other	countries,	and,	not	being	convertible	into	specie,	it	is	not	necessarily	returned	upon	those	who	issued	it;	it	remains	in	the	channel	of	circulation,	and	is	gradually	absorbed	by	increasing	the	prices	of	all	commodities”	(Select	Committee,	1810,	17).				The	new	interpretation	helps	identify	that	the	scheme	in	Proposals	refers	to	something	beyond	this	concern.	Ingots	would	not	circulate	internally	as	money.	The	implication	is	that	by	devising	a	way	to	manage	the	divergences	between	market	and	mint	prices	by	altering	 the	 quantity	 of	 note	 issuance,	 the	 possibility	 for	 profitable	 arbitrage	 and	movement	 of	 gold	 is	 removed.	 The	 significance	 of	 this	 for	 the	 external	 account	 is	elaborated	in	Section	5.	Marcuzzo	and	Rosselli	stress	that	the	“value	of	gold,	namely	the	relative	value	of	gold	in	terms	of	commodities,	has	no	role	to	play	in	Ricardo’s	monetary	analysis”	 (Marcuzzo	 and	 Rosselli	 1994,	 1254-5).	 Ricardo’s	 intention	was	 to	 create	 an	economical	and	secure	monetary	system.	At	the	core	of	this	new	interpretation	is	that	price	 instability	 that	 arises	 from	 market	 processes	 outside	 of	 monetary	 authorities’	control,	 such	as	changes	 in	 the	standard’s	value,	meaning	 the	value	of	gold,	cannot	be	prevented;	 the	 essence	of	Proposals	 is	 that	price	disturbances	 can	be	quelled,	 at	 least	partly,	 through	 the	 element	 that	 is	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 authorities,	 i.e.	 the	manipulation	of	the	money	supply	to	ensure	the	market	and	mint	price	of	gold	do	not	deviate	(Deleplace,	2016).		
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c. Anti-Bullionists	and	endogenous	money	theory	There	 is	 an	 affinity	 between	 the	 objectors	 to	 Ricardo’s	 plan	 and	 some	 contemporary	monetary	theorists.	Current	discussions	on	money	supply	endogeneity	can	be	traced	to	the	 intellectual	 heritage	 of	 the	 anti-Bullionist	 argument	 (Lavoie	 2009).	 According	 to	Schumpeter	 “there	 are	 only	 two	 theories	 of	 money	 which	 deserve	 the	 name,	 the	commodity	theory	and	the	claim	theory.	From	their	very	nature	they	are	incompatible”	(Ellis	1937,	4).		Post	Keynesian	endogenous	money	theory	holds	that	the	money	supply	is	endogenous	to	the	 activities	 of	 the	 real	 private	 sector.	 Rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 money’s	 supply	 as	exogenously	determined	by	the	authorities,	the	focus	is	on	the	demand	for	credit	which	is	 based	 on	 real	 expenditure	 plans	 of	 firms	 and	 their	 future	 expectations	 about	profitability.	Money	is	created	through	a	process	of	credit	creation.	Clear	echoes	from	the	preceding	 discussion	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Dow	 (2006,	 40):	 “Endogenous	money	 theorists	emphasize	particularly	cost-push	forces	for	inflation	…	far	from	causing	inflation	(as	in	the	monetarist	model),	money	comes	at	the	end	of	the	causal	process	by	which	inflation	occurs”.	The	passivity	that	was	attached	to	the	Bank	of	England’s	response	in	the	early	1800s	 is	 echoed	 in	 the	 recent	 literature,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 Post-Keynesian	accommodationist	 view	 (Dow	 2006,	 24).	 Represented	 by	writers	 such	 as	 Kaldor	 and	Moore,	among	others,	it	holds	that	“inflation	could	not	be	caused	by	an	excessively	high	growth	 rate	 of	 the	money	 supply”	 and	 that	 there	 could	 “never	 be	 any	 excess	money	supply”	(Lavoie	2006,	17).	In	opposition	to	Ricardo’s	view,	monetary	authorities	cannot	control	the	money	supply.			Several	important	rebuttals	have	been	made	against	the	anti-Bullionist	ideas.	There	were	legitimate	concerns	that	the	divide	between	a	genuine	and	a	speculative	need	for	credit	was	often	blurred.	With	industry	expanding	rapidly	in	the	early	1800s	there	were	ample	opportunities	for	speculative	ventures,	and	according	to	Niebyl	(1946,	67)	the	Bank	of	England	wanted	 to	 take	 part	 in	 potential	 profit	making	 from	 these	 loans	 to	 business.	Furthermore,	 according	 to	 Goodhart	 (1988),	 the	 problem	 with	 this	 benign	 view	 of	
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supplying	loans	to	merchants	was	that	it	hadn’t	factored	in	the	possibility	of	banks	trying	to	make	their	 liabilities	more	attractive	and	thus	avoid	drains	on	their	reserves	at	 the	Bank	 of	 England.	 “The	 automatic	 loss	 (gain)	 of	 reserves	 through	 the	 clearinghouse	mechanism	accruing	to	relatively	fast	(slow)	growing	banks	tended	to	force	all	banks	to	grow	at	around	the	same	mean	rate,	but	it	provided	no	guide	to	what	would	determine	the	 rate	 of	 growth,	 and	 whether	 that	 could	 be	 expected	 to	 be	 stable	 or	 unstable”	(Goodhart	1988,	47).	Blaug	raises	a	similar	concern,	describing	how	real	bill	discounting	potentially	enhances	credit	boom	and	bust	cycles.	 Increasing	 loans	and	raising	money	incomes,	may	justify	additional	borrowing,	and	so	he	argues,	real	bill	discounting	in	and	of	 itself	does	not	guarantee	a	stability	 in	the	quantity	of	money	or	credit	(Blaug	1962:	632).	 Modern	 attempts	 to	 manipulate	 the	 cash	 rate	 to	 stabilise	 inflation	 may	 have	resulted	in	unchecked	asset	speculation	leading	up	to	the	global	financial	crisis.		
5. Implications	for	the	external	accounts	
 Ricardo’s	 scheme	 is	 intimately	 connected	 with	 international	 exchanges.	 How	 do	 the	different	understandings	of	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory	affect	subsequent	interpretations	of	how	Ricardo	viewed	international	adjustment	and	changes	 in	the	external	account?	Although	both	Takenaga	(2003)	and	the	new	interpretation	aim	to	remove	the	stigma	of	inconsistency	from	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory,	the	way	they	do	this	is	different,	and	can	be	 seen	 by	 disentangling	 movements	 of	 gold	 relating	 to	 international	 arbitrage	opportunities	and	those	that	relate	to	equalisation	of	the	purchasing	power	of	gold	across	countries.			Takenaga	 (2003,	117)	 sees	 the	 inconvertibility	problem	 for	Ricardo	as	one	where	 the	process	 of	 equalisation	of	 the	 values	 of	money	 across	 the	world	 is	 disrupted	 through	inconvertible	money,	as	 it	cannot	be	exported	to	re-establish	the	correct	 international	distribution	of	precious	metals.	Takenaga	summarises	Ricardo’s	ingot	plan	as	the	means	with	which	a	country	can	halt	the	destabilisation	of	the	value	of	money	by	removing	the	barrier	between	the	domestic	and	international	arena.	Once	a	firm	link	is	established	with	gold,	then	money	as	gold	can	move	freely	to	re-establish	an	international	distribution	of	gold	in	which	money’s	value	will	be	equal	in	all	countries.	It	is	this	that	he	portrays	as	Ricardo’s	ultimate	objective.		
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Contrast	 the	approach	of	Marcuzzo,	Rosselli	and	Deleplace	who	see	 the	 importance	of	distinguishing	between	the	value	of	money	and	the	value	of	gold.	The	new	interpretation	stresses	 that	 the	 relationship	between	gold	 and	 commodities	has	no	 role	 in	Ricardo’s	monetary	theory.	Ricardo	does	not	adopt	an	essentially	Humean	account	of	international	adjustment	where	gold	will	flow	until	there	is	a	global	equilibration	of	purchasing	power	of	 gold	 vis	 a	 vis	 commodities	 (Marcuzzo	 and	 Rosselli,	 1987).	 Under	 the	 typical	 price	specie	flow	mechanism	“balance	of	payments	imbalances	adjust	automatically	through	variations	in	price	brought	about	by	flows	of	gold	converted	into	money”	(Rosselli	2013,	869).	Ricardo’s	 ‘monetary’	 side	 of	 his	 theory,	 as	 explained	 in	 Section	3,	 relates	 to	 the	deviations	 between	 the	 fixed	 and	market	 price	 of	 gold.	 Gold	movements	 are	 directly	related	to	the	opportunities	for	profitable	arbitrage	that	would	arise	if	the	market	and	mint	price	of	gold	diverged	far	enough.	According	to	this	view,	it	is	a	variation	in	the	value	of	money	that	governs	gold	movements	and	not	a	variation	in	the	value	of	the	standard,	which	has	no	bearing	on	gold	movements.	“It	 is	not	the	equalisation	of	the	purchasing	power	of	gold	in	terms	of	commodities	that	accounts	for	gold	movements”	(Marcuzzo	and	Rosselli	1994,	1254-5).			Marcuzzo	 and	 Rosselli	 (1987)	 propose	 instead	 that	 the	 well	 organised	 international	market	 for	 gold	 is	 the	means	 through	 which	 equalisation	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	foreign	price	of	gold	is	carried	out.	Gold	flows	will	cease	when	“each	currency	buys	on	the	domestic	market	no	more	and	no	less	gold	than	it	buys	on	the	foreign	markets”	(1987,	368).	It	is	in	this	light	that	Ricardo’s	ingot	plan	should	be	viewed.	It	is	a	means	to	remove	the	opportunities	for	arbitrage	by	containing	any	difference	between	the	mint	and	market	prices	 of	 gold.	 This	 would	 in	 part	 stabilise	 the	 prices	 of	 commodities	 by	 removing	fluctuations	arising	from	variations	in	the	prices	of	gold.	According	to	this	interpretation,	any	changes	in	the	value	of	gold	in	terms	of	commodities	cannot	be	under	the	control	of	the	monetary	authorities.			Were	the	ingot	plan	to	be	operationalised,	the	implication	of	the	new	interpretation	goes	one	step	further	than	that	implied	by	Sayers	above	on	reserving	gold	for	international	transactions.	The	new	interpretation	implies	that	international	gold	exchange	would	not	be	profitable	if	mint	and	market	price	didn’t	diverge.	The	evidence	they	provide	from	the	practice	of	gold	merchants	suggests	that	if	this	was	the	case,	it	would	always	cost	less	to	
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obtain	 foreign	 currency	 domestically	 than	 it	would	 to	 ship	 gold	 to	 obtain	 it	 (Rosselli,	2013).		These	 findings	 are	 relevant	 to	 contemporary	 problems.	 Although	 the	 Bullionist’s	preoccupation	about	 the	 lack	of	acceptability	of	 inconvertible	paper	money	out	of	 the	country	of	issue	is	clearly	a	concern	which	belongs	to	a	period	far	from	today,	Ricardo’s	quest	for	a	stable	monetary	system	is	still	very	much	alive,	both	in	practice	as	well	as	in	theory.	 Despite	 the	 advances	 made	 in	 international	 macroeconomics,	 several	unanswered	issues	about	the	nature	of	cross	border	money	remain,	and	how	its	value	or	acceptability	is	determined.	Ricardo’s	method,	as	for	example	in	the	High	Price	of	Bullion	(1810),	 builds	his	 theoretical	 argument	by	 starting	 from	an	analysis	 of	 a	 system	with	metallic	monetary	only,	moving	to	a	metallic	and	convertible	notes	system	in	order	to	analyse	the	dynamics	and	problems	of	an	inconvertible	money	system.	Carrying	over	the	anti-Bullionist	 arguments	 in	 order	 to	 appreciate	 the	dynamics	 of	 today’s	 credit	 based	monetary	system,	perhaps	the	method	needs	to	be	reversed.	Hicks	(1967)	highlighted	how	monetary	 theory	 ought	 to	 evolve	with	 how	 the	 system	 evolves,	 and	 his	 position	shifted	 to	 emphasize	 how	 understanding	 credit	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 money	 in	 a	monetary	economy	at	whatever	stage	of	development	(see	Smithin	2003,	30).	This	may	be	 the	 most	 essential	 hurdle	 Ricardo’s	 monetary	 theory	 confronts.	 Ricardo’s	 world	centred	on	developing	a	system	to	best	link	paper	money	to	gold.	Proposals	is	concerned	with	money	as	made	up	of	currency	and	bank	notes,	whereas	 the	main	component	of	today’s	money	supply,	bank	deposits,	which	are	also	the	main	vehicle	for	credit	extension	are	excluded. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion	
 Two	hundred	years	after	the	publication	of	Ricardo’s	ingot	plan,	the	debate	on	its	precise	meaning	 is	 still	 lively.	 Such	 practical	 blueprints	 to	 monetary	 problems	 as	 Ricardo’s	
Proposals	 are	 not	 so	 frequent	 today.	 This	 paper	 draws	 parallels	 between	 the	 issues	theorists	faced	in	the	debates	from	which	Ricardo’s	Proposals	emerged	and	those	that	are	
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relevant	 to	 current	 monetary	 problems.	 It	 is	 by	 studying	 contributions	 around	 prior	debates	and	works	like	Proposals	which	could	help	illuminate	modern	concerns.				
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